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SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE FOREIGN
ISSUER EXEMPTION: A STUDY IN THE
PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATING
FOREIGN INTERESTS
Richard M. Buxbaumt
This article has three aims. It describes, in the minimum detail
needed to make the matter clear to nonspecialists, the regime created
by statute and administrative action governing securities regulation
and the foreign issuer;' it essays a few critical comments on that
regime; and it explores the administrative process by which the cur-
rent arrangement was created. From such a process study we may learn
about the ways, values and dangers of subjecting transnational financial
and commercial activity to local regulation.
The regulation of business enterprises whose activities interest
more than one state is not easily reducible to general legal norms. One
common but somewhat sterile preliminary characterization of trans-
national regulation concerns the nature of the hold the regulating
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to thank his colleagues, Frank C. Newman of the University of California and Eckard
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I A detailed but not always clear resunm of the present SEC regulation of foreign
issuers subject to § 12(g) of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 15 U.S.C. § 78C(g)
(Supp. 1967), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78C (1964), Exchange Act of 1934, added by 78 Stat. 566
(1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78C(g) (1964) is contained in Goldman & Magrino, Foreign Issuers and
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw. 135 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Goldman & Magrino]. The current situation can best be understood when viewed
against the legislative history of the 1964 Amendments and the originally proposed
regulation; see Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of The Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 754-62 [hereinafter cited as Phillips & Shipman].
A brief overview of the current picture is also found in H. STEINER & D. VAGTs,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 967-73 (1968). This, however, concentrates upon the
"extraterritoriality" of the regulation, as do the earlier comments (on the first proposed
regulatory scheme) of Stevenson, The Effect of the New SEC Registration Requirements
on Foreign Issuers, in N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N, ADDRESSES AT MEETING OF BANKING, CorP'N & Bus.
L. SECTION 8 (Feb. 3, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson]; The Committee on Interna-
tional Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The 1964 Amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Proposed Securities and Exchange Rules-In-
ternational Law Aspects, 21 REcoRD 240 (1966). See also Note, The Proposed SEC Regula-
tions for Foreign Over-the-Counter Securities: A Delicate Step Forward in the Evolution
of Disclosure, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 326 (1966); W. Kronstein, Publizitdtspflicht ausliindischer
Aktiengesellschaften in USA, 11 AuSSENWsRTSCAFrTSDIENST DES BErRIBs-BERATERS 432 (1965).
The former is a detailed, the latter a summary review of the proposed regulation before
its modification.
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state attempts to obtain over such activities. To use Anglo-American
concepts, there is a superficial distinction between attempts to gain
jurisdiction over the person in order to force obeisance to orders
of omission or commission, and attempts to obtain and destroy the
"thing" that is causing harm to protectible interests.2 At times this
distinction may suggest the propriety or impropriety of a given re-
sponse. If inflammable textiles are imported by a State Regulating
dealer buying from a State Transacting enterprise, their seizure under
a health and safety regulation of and in the former state would be gen-
erally accepted; an attempt to impose sanctions upon the exporting
enterprise might not be. The power to achieve the latter step is not
questioned in Anglo-American law,3 even if service of process limita-
tions force use of quasi-in-rem jurisdictional principles to allow the
seized goods to substitute for the enterprise in matters of judgment
satisfaction. The propriety of attempting to hold the person, however,
depends not upon abstract principles of jurisdiction but upon such
substantive questions as the extent and directness of the enterprise's
efforts to exploit the State Regulating market with defective wares. In
any event, the suggested distinction is often meaningless for quite a
different reason. The seizure of the "thing"-amounting finally to a
closing of the foreign market to the enterprise-may well be so pain-
ful to the enterprise that it will accept personal orders of omission or
commission as the preferable alternative.4
It is also difficult to categorize transnational activities on the basis
2 For a thorough review and analysis of these jurisdictional concepts, see Trautman,
The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regula-
tory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1961). See also, in the domestic context, Von
Mehren 9- Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 1121 (1966).
3 This statement assumes that in the area of economic regulation the defensive ter-
ritorial, or protective, principle applies, and that current customary rules of public in-
ternational law do not prohibit municipal legislation of the sort discussed in the text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)
(1965). See also the limited reach of § 33, Id.
It is possible, however, to argue that an excessively aggressive use of this legislation
is wrong; whether wrong as a matter of comity or as an "abuse of right" (and thus illegal
as a matter of international law) is a matter of some doubt. See note 44 infra. I do not
believe, however, that more protection of legitimate foreign interests is available through
such concepts than through the "open process" approach discussed in the following text.
4 See Magnusson, The Need for International Agreement on Obtaining Evidence
From Foreign Countries, 26 FED. B.J. 232 (1966) for examples of "hard line" reactions to
regulatory conflicts that would be unimpeachable under traditional legal concepts. A
recent example is the promulgation of directly conflicting regulatory orders involving
the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association (production of documents); see
Financial Times, Aug. 30, 1968, at 8, col. 6.
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of their factual distinctions. Yet one might usefully define three types
of transnational operations in the expectation that the legal principles
applicable in guiding efforts at supervision will vary depending on
which of the three types of operations best characterizes the activities
to be supervised: (1) An enterprise of State Transacting is present in
State Regulating and acts there in ways legally analogous to the ways
it acts in State Transacting, although not necessarily with the same de-
gree of intensity. An example is the creation of a manufacturing and
sales subsidiary in State Regulating. (2) An enterprise of State Trans-
acting carries on activities from which it expects profits to be generated
out of State Regulating in a reasonably direct fashion. For example, the
enterprise sells goods to State Regulating importers or merchants (per-
haps through a sales subsidiary there, perhaps directly), or it seeks to
raise capital on the State Regulating financial market. (3) An enter-
prise of State Transacting, as a result of essentially local activities, in-
directly and inadvertently affects interests that the law of State
Regulating wishes to protect. For example, products whose quality is
dubious enough to generate products liability in State Regulating but
not in State Transacting may be sold by the enterprise to local third
parties who independently export them to State Regulating. A second
example would be the investment by State Regulating brokers in secu-
rities of a State Transacting enterprise, made originally through pur-
chases in the latter state but eventually resulting in trading in those
securities by State Regulating investors.
At times the transnational nature of the conflict will benefit the
dealing parties; State Regulating for overriding "political" reasons may
soften its position if State Transacting prohibits the commission of acts
State Regulating deems desirable. 5 This heightened confrontation, how-
ever, only confirms that it is in the evaluation of the relative impor-
tance of substantive interests that most of the conflicts find their reso-
lution.
In the arena of state resolution of transnational financial and
commercial activity the role of the lawyer is to identify material in-
terests, to evaluate arguments of the legitimacy of those interests, and
to rank them in making arguments for honest and defensible policy
decisions. In an ideal world, inductively generalized principles would
give the policy maker the tools for doing this work efficiently. But in
this field-where events are sporadic, relatively rare, enormously dif-
5 Good examples are the hassles over the production of documents familiar from
antitrust cases, and the occasional disputes over certain restrictive practices (or acts cor-
rective thereof) in antitrust litigation.
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ferentiated and complicated, involve high stakes, and as a result of all
this are highly politicized-generalizations have a habit either of being
uselessly vague or of hiding direct, conclusory positions. If generaliza-
tions can ever be useful, they will at least have to be derived from the
study of events such as the one here to be described.
I
THE PROBLEM
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 govern the issuance of securities, the trade in securities (in-
cluding the functioning of the various markets and the professionals
acting therein) and certain aspects of the continuing relationship
between issuers and their security holders. The regulatory scheme is
stringent and complex and, at least so far as trading in securities is
concerned, of growing and uncertain scope, particularly because of the
expanding role of civil liability for fraudulent trading. From the
standpoint of an issuer of securities, the important provisions are those
imposing a number of registration and reporting requirements, a set
of duties involving the solicitation of proxies from shareholders, and
automatic civil liability for short-swing trading in securities by certain
"insider" groups.6 All these burdens, however, only arise following one
or the other of two controllable events: A primary distribution of the
issuer's stock on the American capital market in order to raise capital
here, or the voluntary listing of a class of the issuer's stock on a national
exchange in order to enjoy an orderly trading market in the United
States.
With the passage of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,7 this
situation changed. The mentioned burdens were thereby imposed
upon issuers with gross assets of at least one million dollars and with at
least one class of equity securities held by five hundred or more share-
holders. The decision of coverage is no longer directly within the con-
trol of any issuer, and thus the obligations mentioned are imposed
rather than accepted. The original acts and the 1964 amendments
apply to foreign as well as domestic issuers. The reasons for extending
coverage, however, are not necessarily the same for the two groups.
In recognition of this consideration, in 1964 the Securities and Ex-
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964); § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1964); § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
7 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77h, 78c-78s (1964).
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change Commission was again given almost unlimited power to create
exemptions for foreign issuers.8
II
THE EXEMPTION STORY
Immediately after the passage of the 1964 legislation, the SEC
granted foreign issuers an exemption from the requirement of an
initial section 12(g) registration until November 30, 1965; 9 during
1965 this exemption was extended to November 30, 1966.10 Since the
registration obligation, under the statutory system, only arises 120 days
after conclusion of a fiscal year, it became effective no earlier than
April 1, 1967. In the meantime the SEC issued its regulations as
to substantive coverage and exemptions. It did this by publishing
"proposed regulations" in November 1965,11 following approxi-
mately one year of informal but intensive discussions with interested
foreign parties, ranging from personal interchanges at the SEC offices
to diplomatic notes.12 Such activity continued during 1966 and sub-
stantial changes were discussed during that year as well. 13 The modified
regulations went into effect on April 28, 1967, slightly late but with
a dispensation for any company forced into late disclosure as a result
of the delay.14
These regulations, which cover only the registration process, pro-
vide that registration is not required if there are less than three hun-
dred shareholders (of a world-wide total of at least five hundred
shareholders) of a class of securities resident in the United States. If
the foreign securities are not directly owned but are deposited in
exchange for American Depositary Receipts, no registration duty is
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78 C(g)(3) (1964). For a full
review of the history of this exemption and its legislative road, see Phillips § Shipman,
supra note 1, at 754-55.
9 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7427 (Sept. 15, 1964); Rule 12g3-1, 17
C.F.R. § 24 0.12g3-1 (1968).
10 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7867 (Apr. 21, 1966).
11 SEC Securities Exchange Act Releases Nos. 7746-49 (Nov. 16, 1965); Proposed
rule 12g3-2 was the most important of the rules and forms suggested for adoption.
12 See Goldman & Magrino, supra note 1, at 137.
13 The SEC has available for inspection at its headquarters a large file, "Letters Of
Comment On Proposed Rules And Forms Relating To Foreign Issuers," containing com-
ments upon the proposed rules (invited by the Commission in Nov. 1965 Releases that
followed an October meeting with industry representatives), dated late 1965 and early
1966.
14 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8066, at 2 (Apr. 28, 1967).
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imposed upon the latter as such, consonant with earlier established
practice,15 but individual holdings of ADRs are counted with holdings
of foreign share certificates in calculating the three hundred share-
holders in those cases where both forms co-exist.16
Registration is the event that normally triggers the other obliga-
tions and liabilities already mentioned: Periodic financial and opera-
tional report requirements, proxy solicitation requirements, and in-
sider trading sanctions. In addition, failure to register when required
could give rise to sanctions not only against the issuer but, more im-
portantly, against the securities themselves in the sense of outlawing
their trade and subjecting dealers therein to separate sanctions. These
results, which need not automatically follow, are the subject of later
discussion.
A full accommodation to foreign interests has been reached as to
the proxy solicitation requirements and the insider trading disabilities.
The effect of the SEC regulation is simply to exempt those foreign is-
suers and insiders putatively subject to registration from the operation
of sections 14 and 16 of the 1934 Act which impose those burdens.1 7
15 See note 67 infra and accompanying text. If there are 300 ADRs, however, the
underlying shares are to be "registered." For a description of the American Depository
Receipt, see in addition to authority cited in notes 35 & 37 infra, Moxley, The ADR: An
Instrument of International Finance and a Tool of Arbitage, 8 ViLL. L. Ray. 19 (1962).
16 Rule 12g3-2(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 270.12g3-2(a)(1) (1968). Although rule 12g3-2(c)
separately exempts ADRs from § 12(g), the provision of (a)(1), counting as separate
"holders" each separate customer account of a dealer who holds nominal title to the
foreign security can be read as including ADRs. The practical consequences of reading the
rule to include ADR holders may not be too important, since a foreign issuer usually
authorizes an ADR operation whenever the volume of domestic trading warrants it;
nevertheless, the same issue is occasionally found in both ADR and normal form.
The lower numbers-count for foreign issuers, compared with the domestic minimum
of 500, has been criticized as discriminatory. Rehbinder, Publizitit Und Auslandsbezie-
hungen, in DAs UNTERNEHMEN IN DER REcHTSORDNUNG-FEsTGABE FuR HEINRICH KRONSrEIN
203, 210 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rehbinder]. It derives from § 12(g)(4), which maintains
§ 12(g) status for a domestic company once caught (i.e., once having met the 500 share-
holder test) until the count drops below 300, but is patently, if not significantly, discrimi-
natory when compared with that domestic scheme. Proving that the 300 holder requirement
has been reached may be difficult, especially in the case of bearer shares. Phillips &
Shipman, supra note 1, at 756-57.
17 This was achieved in 1966 through the adaptation of the earlier identical exemp-
tion, available to foreign issuers since 1935, to the new § 12(g) scheme. Rule 3a12-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1968). Technically, the exemption is available to issuers registering
under § 12(g) (authorized to file on Form 20, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220 (1968), the § 12(g)
form). Presumably, the shift of the SEC, detailed below, to an exemption in lieu of,
rather than upon, registration obviates the need to order specifically the further
exemptions from §§ 14 and 16, under which the issuers and insiders involved would
otherwise fall. Query, whether the failure of such issuers to comply with the below-
described conditions for obtaining the § 12(g) exemption will also subject them to the
1969]
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This result was in a sense dictated by history, as the SEC has long
granted the same dispensation to voluntary foreign registrants and
issuers seeking national exchange listing, groups whose subjection to
these sections would seem a fortiori required before section 12(g) com-
panies should be so treated.' In consequence, foreign issuers subject
to section 12(g) at the outset have faced only the duty of disclosing the
information required by the registration statement and by the periodic
reporting obligations. Even here a major accommodation has been made.
Section 12(g) companies are now by rule exempted from that section
if they furnish the Commission certain initial and recurrent informa-
tion.19 These pseudo-registration disclosures are to some extent pat-
terned after those required for voluntary registration of securities upon
application for issue permits or for trading on a national exchange.
Although these filings normally include a large amount of relevant
financial and operational information, submissions required of foreign
issuers under the 1964 Amendments are limited to information the
issuer: (1) Is by the law of its domicile required to make public there,
(2) files with any stock exchange on which its securities are traded if
that exchange makes the information public, or (3) voluntarily dis-
tributes to its security holders.20 Even these submissions, since they
reach of §§ 14 and 16, and more relevantly, to the private action exposure that their
presumed violations of these provisions will create. The doubt centers upon the wording
of rule 3a12-3: "Securities for which the filing of registration statements on Form
20 ... is authorized shall be exempt from the operation of Section 14 and 16 of the
[Securities Exchange] Act .. " Miscreant issuers only lose the exemption from § 12(g).
See rule 12g3-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 270.12g3-2(b)(1) (1968). If they then file, do they and
their insiders still enjoy the exemption of rule 3a12-3? If, as is likely, they do not file,
have they taken themselves out of the exemption?
18 As to both, see rules 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1968), and rule 14a-2(d), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(d) (1968); 2 L. Loss, SECURiTIEs REGULATION 794 n.30, 874, 1110 (2d ed.
1961). A recent explanation of the purposes of these exemptions is found in Hearings on
H.R. 6789 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 179 (1963).
19 Rule 12g3-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1) (1968).
20 Id. The major procedural difference between the originally proposed rule (SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7746 (Nov. 16, 1965)) and that finally adopted is the
elimination of a filing requirement under § 12(g) in favor of an exemption from § 12(g)'s
filing requirement once certain information is "furnished to" the Commission. The
substantive change in terms of information required is minor. Originally, at least a
balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement of the latest fiscal year, a description of the
issuer's business, and a review of holders' rights under the registered securities were to
be filed, in addition to the information still required, described in the text. Why the
minor safeguard entailed in ensuring that so much was included in the "home country
standard" was dropped is not clear; there was no significant objection to the originally
framed substantive scope of the registration requirement. See Stevenson, supra note 1,
at 12; Rehbinder, supra note 16, at 210.
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might include a flood of trivia, are further reduced by a definition
of relevant information.
The periodic reporting obligations under section 13 of the 1964
Act, which for a domestic issuer are triggered by the involuntary ini-
tial registration, are eliminated entirely for the foreign issuer. Nor-
mally section 13 (as implemented by SEC rules) requires annual and
semi-annual reports, and current reports upon the happening of such
events as changes in the control of the registrant, major asset changes,
changes in the terms of securities or increase or decrease thereof, and
the like. So far as involuntarily "registering" foreign issuers are con-
cerned, the current report requirement has been dropped by the SEC
in favor of a simplified approach requiring annual reporting of other-
wise covered events only to the extent required for initial "registra-
tion."121 At least equally important, neither "registration" nor "report-
ing" is subject to the rigorous American accounting format imposed
by Regulation S-X.22 Failure of a foreign issuer to meet these require-
ments will, of course, trigger the applicability of section 12(g), and with
it the applicability of section 18 (reporting requirements), and per-
haps of sections 14 (proxy solicitation) and 16 (insider trading). How
these swords, and the one penalizing a failure to register, are to fall
upon foreign issuers is not clear. It is not dear that the exemption
from sections 14 and 16, granted by rule 3a12-3, ends when section 12
has been violated;23 nor is it clear how these consequences are to be
brought home to the foreign issuer.
The benefits of this modified regulatory scheme, after much pul-
ling and hauling, have also been extended to other North American
foreign issuers. The historical discrimination against Canadian issuers
rested as much upon the extensive participation of United States
capital in Canadian enterprise as it did upon the freewheeling nature
of the Canadian investment market.24 The improvement of regulatory
21 Rule 12g3-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1) (1968). Originally, an annual
balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement were required; again it is unlikely that these
will not be forthcoming under the basic reporting requirement (which is identical with
the basic "submission') and equally puzzling why the safeguard nonetheless assuring
their availability was dropped.
22 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1968). For the details of the varied and partial exemptions from
its requirements that have been available to some foreign issuers, see RAPPAPORT, SEC
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PRocEaUR 2625-.42 (2d rev. ed. 1966); see also 1 L. Loss,
supra note 18, at 366-68.
23 See note 17 supra.
24 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 1995-2004; Cohen & Throop, Investment of Private
Capital in Foreign Securities, in A LAWYER's GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINESS TRANSAc-
TIONs 519, 594-96 (A. Surrey & C. Shaw eds. 1963); Note, Enforcing United States Securities
Regulation Against Canadians: Conflict of Laws Problems, 66 HAu.v. L. REv. 1081 (1953).
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controls at the provincial and to some extent the federal level has
changed the latter situation; and this may account for the SEC's deci-
sion to drop the original proposal, which required full compliance with
registration and reporting duties and imposed the proxy solicitation
and insider trading sanctions. 25 Some of the remaining slack may be
taken up by the new provision that precludes enjoyment of the modi-
fied scheme in the case of "essentially United States" issuers-com-
panies the stock of which is more than fifty per cent in United States
hands and the business of which is administered principally in the
United States or by United States directors. 26 All such issuers remain
section 12(g) companies, and are subject to sections 13, 14, and 16.
Finally, a description of the sanction mechanism is in order. The
exemption from the onerous (and United States-system oriented) proxy
solicitation requirements and insider trading disabilities has already
been mentioned. The only statutory civil liability for false disclosures
in the registration and reporting statements is that of section 18 of
the 1934 Act, which imposes liability upon the maker for damages
suffered by any person who relied upon a false and misleading state-
ment, contained in a registration statement or other filed document,
in purchasing or selling a security at a price that was affected by
such statement.27 As weak as the section 18 weapon is, the SEC has
attempted to remove even this basis for liability by the ingenious step
of proclaiming that the documents submitted by the involuntary
foreign registrant shall be deemed not filed for section 18 purposes. 28
Well-considered doubt was expressed as to the validity of this exemp-
tion when the proposed regulation still required a section 12(g)
registration but on a form calling for less than normally required in-
formation.29 The 1964 Amendments permit the SEC to exempt foreign
25 The rationale of the SEC in originally proposing continued full application of
its requirements to Canadian issuers was not designed to achieve that purpose and is,
if anything, more consonant with the final result:
"This policy is based upon the similarity between business and accounting practices
in those countries [Canada, Mexico and Cubal] and those in the United States, as well
as upon the greater familiarity of nationals of such countries with United States require-
ments." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 7746 (Nov. 16, 1965).
26 Rule 12g3-2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(e) (1968).
27 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
28 Rule 12g3-2(b)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-2(b)(4) (1968). That such statutory provisions
can sometimes be rejuvenated, see Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), and more
generally, Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29 Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action
Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence
for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 925, 937-39, 948-60
(1966).
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issuers from the entire registration-with-sequels scheme of section 12,30
but do not seem to permit alteration of the regime of the basic 1934
Act once registration, with or without sequels, is imposed by the
agency. Thus it may still be an open question whether these objections
remain valid under the new "information in lieu of registration"
scheme.
The legal justification (as distinguished from the business justi-
fication) for the SEC exemption from sections 14 and 16 is more clearly
legitimate, since these sections are in the main statements of affirmative
duties of issuers and "insiders" which the Commission has decided
are not appropriate to the policing of foreign issuers. The private rights
of action created by the two sections enforce these affirmative duties
and can only arise if the affirmative duties are imposed and then not
honored.31 Section 18, however, is purely a private right of action,
declared by law to arise whenever sections 12 and 13 are affirmatively
violated. It does not seem likely that the SEC, by a regulation not
based upon specific delegation of authority to do so, can negate an
express statutory right of private action. In any event the issue is al-
most academic, given the unsuitability of section 18 as a weapon of
private recovery.32 Lurking in the background is the more menacing
and not wholly imaginary horror of rule lOb-5, whose uncertain reach
may extend to the trade in foreign securities, 33 even granting the
power of the SEC to preclude this result by promulgating specific
regulatory exemptions from the rule.
There are, of course, other sanctions available under the overall
30 Section 12g(3), its original reverse reading (statutory exemption with power in
the SEC to revoke it) and its significance in this respect are discussed in Phillips & Ship-
man, supra note 1, at 754-55.
31 See Shipman, supra note 29, at 945-48.
32 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 1751-54.
33 Compare Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), and Kook v.
Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.DN.Y. 1960), with Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), and SEC v. Gulf Intercont'l Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (SD. Fla. 1963). The cases
are not directly comparable, treating respectively substantive and procedural jurisdiction
(see Ferraioli v. Cantor, supra, at 845 n.4), but are nevertheless revealingly different in
their attitude toward the problem. See Note, 69 CoLuaf. L. Rlv. 94 (1969); Note, supra
note 24, at 1089 n.65. See also Roth v. Fund Of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966); Order Accepting Offer of Settle-
ment, SEC Securities Exchange Act Releage No. 8083 (May 23, 1967), reprinted in 6 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'L 412 (1967). In the domestic context, see Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959) (law of forum governs
scope of foreign corporation's directors' duty of disclosure where forum was seat of many
corporate transactions); Note, Conflict of Laws-Duty of Director of Foreign Corporation
to Shareholder Held Governed by Law of Forum When Corporate Activity Centers in
Forum, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 742 (1960).
1969]
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regulatory system presently in effect. The SEC may sue to prevent
violations of the Act, or to enforce duties imposed by the Act and its
regulations. The procurement of in personam jurisdiction over the
necessary foreign parties, assuming the substantive reach of the law,
should not be more difficult than obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over foreign parties generally. The more potent weapon available to
the SEC is its potential jurisdiction over the trade and traders in
foreign securities or in American Depository Receipts whose issuers,
whether as non-feasants or malfeasants, are not performing the above-
described duties. In particular, dealers in these securities, under pain
of disciplinary proceedings and the concomitant creation of private
damage actions, can be forced to desist from handling such securities
or at least to disclose the deficiencies and violations as a condition of
trading.34 Indeed, the SEC has the power to order dealers to warn
investors that they are buying securities the information on which
does not reach "American" standards even when the issuer thereof is
in full compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements.3 5
Finally, of course, there is the intangible but effective sanction of
public disclosure of violations. SEC regulations in particular and
American practice in general permit the citation of chapter and verse
to an extent unknown in most European countries. What of all this
panoply the SEC has in fact decided to use will be discussed later. All
in all, however, an evaluation of the accommodation reached can for
the moment assume that methods exist to assure that the accommoda-
tion will be honored and can concentrate upon its substance.
III
CRITIQUE
Such a review should consider both the substantive interests in-
volved on each side and the process by which these interests are identi-
fied and weighed.
Although there is no uniform "foreign issuer" position, partic-
ularly if United States trade in Canadian securities is included under
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964);
see 3 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 1791-92.
35 See Proposed Rule 15ci-0, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7746 (Nov.
16, 1965). It was, "at the present time," not adopted; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8066, at 3 (Apr. 28, 1967). For a narrative review of the SEC attitude toward the
problem, see Brownell, Cohen, Heller, Loss & Stevenson, Legal Problems of Issuing and
Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND
INv ESTMENT 430, 447-50 (J. McDaniels ed. 1964).
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that label, the arguments of agents of the German companies affected by
the 1964 Amendments seem representative enough for discussion.30
Their major claim was that the issuers were not voluntarily entering
the United States securities market for purposes of primary distribu-
tion, but were caught by the 1964 Amendments because of indepen-
dent transactions by unrelated investors or dealers.37 This point is
central to any discussion of the obligations that such issuers seek to
avoid. As a result it is important to differentiate between those obli-
gations that affect the issuer at its foreign domicile and those that affect
American-based trading in its securities. That the latter obligations
may make trading sufficiently unattractive to keep the securities from
the market is of no real moment; indeed, it is a consequence accepted
in principle once the inadvertency of the issuer's connection with the
regulating state is asserted. This point becomes particularly important
in discussing the SEC's regulation of the American dealer in foreign
securities.
Given this involuntary connection, certain of the burdens imposed
by the 1964 Amendments may lose their justification in the foreign
context, quite apart from the problem of the unsuitability of trans-
posing some of these burdens into that context. But a decision as to
the justifiability of a particular obligation is not so easy as may appear
at first glance. For example, the fact that the proxy solicitation process
is "domestic" in its detail does not make its imposition abroad factually
impossible or normatively outrageous. Before an annual meeting, a
foreign issuer can legally send its American shareholders information
of the sort rule 14-A requires, whether or not it submits the same in-
formation to its domestic shareholders. Further, given that what the
shareholder wants is not a knowledgeable minority position but a knowl-
edgeable shareholder family,38 the issuer can be "required"-in the
sense of making this a condition of opening the American market to
its securities-to send the same detail even to its domestic share-
holders. Even something like a ban on short-swing insider trading can
be imposed, not because in personam jurisdiction can occasionally be
a Komitee ffilr Fragen der Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 [Gierlichs Com-
mittee], Memorandum fiber die Publizitift deutscher Aktiengesellschaften im Hinblick
auf den Schutz der Investoren, Apr. 28, 1965, and accompanying letter to Manuel F.
Cohen, Esq., May 6, 1965. See also Komitee fiir Fragen der Securities Acts Amendments
of 1964, Memorandum fiber die Publizitlit deutscher Aktiengesellschaften im Hinblick
auf den Schutz der Investoren, July 5, 1965, bringing the Apr. 28 memorandum up to
date following the passage of the Aktiengesetz of 1965.
37 Letter to Manuel F. Cohen, Esq., supra note 36, at 8.
38 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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obtained over the insider in the United States, but because the issuer
can be forced-by the simple expedient of stopping United States
trading as a sanction-to consider taking internal preventive measures
of a contractual nature against the practice.
The matter of choice is stressed because it places emphasis upon
the substantive considerations: The importance of protecting local in-
terests weighed against the burdens thus imposed upon the foreign
business. Of course, procedural and mechanical considerations have
their place in choosing the least onerous satisfactory regulation. Ex-
perience shows that using conceptual considerations as to the "extra-
territorial" character of the regulation, or worse, abstractions such as
"public international law limits on extraterritorial regulation," in
reaching solutions only renders the underlying struggle of material
interests unprincipled. Law is better served where we insist upon dis-
closure of the substantive considerations involved and weigh them
directly. If a given regulation can be imposed only through dispro-
portionately burdensome efforts at enforcement or compliance, the
benefits thereof may not be worth the bother. But that is a policy
matter.39
Seen in this light, what are the issues that should have been
joined? Returning to the initial classification, 40 as to all burdens
affecting the foreign issuer directly a distinction can be drawn between
those incompatible with domestic procedure and the rest. If the proxy
solicitation requirements are arguably incompatible, then it is not
because American procedure requires unique disclosures prohibited
locally, but because meaningful solicitation would impose on the
foreign issuer use of the burdensome American standard vis-4-vis all
shareholders. This incompatibility is not a legal one, however, since
foreign law presumably does not forbid disclosures of the kind re-
quired by rule 14A. It is, strictly speaking, not an incompatibility at
all. It hardly differs analytically from the safety requirements newly
imposed upon foreign cars exported to the United States. 41 Only
these, of all foreign cars produced, need conform to the requirements.
Yet Volkswagenwerk AG might have to conform its entire production
to these standards if its assembly line did not segregate United States-
bound production from the rest. This comparison forcefully suggests
that "unfairness" is the problem.
Further, the sanction for violating an otherwise reasonable obliga-
39 See pp. 873-75 infra.
40 See p. 360 supra.
41 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1409
(Supp. II, 1966).
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tion may also trigger the "disproportionate burden" complaint.4 2 Con-
sideration of the Volkswagen analogy at greater length may be helpful.
If Volkswagenwerk AG were directly interested in export to the United
States, imposing local standards might be acceptable even though, due
to unsegregated production lines, the standards are imposed for all cars
it produces. If the company's competitive cost position in its other
markets is so jeopardized thereby as to force it to abandon United
States exports, however, the "detriment" side of the scale would weigh
more heavily. This might tip the decision, but that is all.
If VW exports occur despite the producer's lack of interest in
them, the propriety of imposing American standards might depend
more upon the particular sanction. The cars might be barred at entry,
or local alterations required, to the financial detriment of the trading
parties. American law might impose absolute tort liability in the event
of accidents-but against the American importer or dealer. All of
these sanctions at most go to inhibit United States imports. If by defi-
nition these are uninteresting to the foreign producer, the sanctions
presumably would be of no concern to it. If VW were interested, then
the "foreign detriment" element in the scale must be given more
weight.
If, however, absolute tort liability were imposed upon Volks-
wagenwerk AG despite its lack of interest in, and worse, inability to
prevent, exports to the United States, a different situation results-
one which can be judged by a more stringent notion of "unfairness. '43
This is a qualitative difference. When applied to proxy solicitation it
suggests the need to look at the sanction involved, rather than at the
solicitation requirement. If it is assumed that ownership of shares by
American residents cannot be prevented, and the sanction operates to
punish the foreign issuer for what it cannot prevent, the sanction should
be discarded. If on the other hand the sanction acts against trading
operations only, it can be evaluated as part of the described weighing
process. This process can be used when the regulation is essentially
administrative and equally well when it is an abstract command
coupled with civil sanctions.44
42 Another less obvious but perhaps equally important factor would be the burden
upon the regulating state of creating the administrative apparatus to process compliance
and pursue non-compliance, especially given the relatively inefficient channels and means
available to achieve the latter purpose.
43 As a practical matter, this would be a rare case in light of the difficulties of
procuring in personam jurisdiction over the foreign company. Consider, however, that
the manufacturer may be present in the jurisdictional sense through other commercial
activities.
44 Some commentators, however, would distinguish between abstract obligation and
sanction simply on the basis that a particular sanction was too harsh an expression of
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The short-swing profit ban requires a more extended analysis, as
here an additional "burden" exists: the unavailability under the
foreign law of such a recoupment action. The inability of Volkswagen-
werk AG to accept American safety requirements and remain compet-
itive in the United States market is a factual barrier. The inability
of a foreign issuer to accept an obligation to police a short-swing ban
at its domicile is a matter of foreign law. Even though the issuer has no
interest in a United States market for its securities, this is a situation
where fairness-perhaps sanctified by the magic label "comity," as an
apparent conflict in obeisance exists-might dictate an exemption.
The fact that the sanction involved is not one comparable to absolute
tort liability might, in this case, be ignored-a result dictated all the
more, of course, if the sanction is penal rather than a mere ban on
American trade in the securities.45 Of course, this is typological discus-
sion only; the actual justification for the section 16 exemption is not
thus proved. As mentioned, section 16 imposes duties and liabilities
not upon the issuer but upon the insider. If there is no obligation upon
the issuer to police the ban, the consequences of a violation fall only
upon the insider, who is held accountable only if subject to the juris-
diction of American courts. 46 Such an insider's reluctant acceptance
of the burden of refraining from short-swing transactions might be
an important factor in deciding upon the exemption, but since his
abstention from trading is not forbidden by the law governing his
transactions, no unique element of comity is added to the factors
properly considered.
From this discussion it should be clear that most of the issues in-
volved in deciding on the application of securities trading standards to
foreign securities can be handled in a straightforward fashion. A look
at the one obligation the SEC retained, the quasi-registration require-
ment, may confirm this point.
"extraterritoriality." See, e.g., S. KLAUE, UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLOjSSE NACHI § 23
DES [GWB] MIT UND ZWISCHEN AUSLANDISCHEN UNTERNEHMEN 75-78 (n.d. 1967); E.
REHBINDER, EXTRATERRITORIALE WIRKUNGEN DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS 87-88 (1965).
45 The possibility that a penal sanction might be visited upon the American dealer
in the issuer's securities is probably irrelevant, since such a dealer has the option of
abstaining from this business.
46 Since the provision calls for recovery by the corporation of these profits, the
possibility that it may be found in the United States for jurisdictional purposes is by
definition irrelevant. Such esoterica are but alter ego allegations seeking to reach the
insider through the corporation. But see Empire Steel Corp. of Texas v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961). The enforcement of American
regulatory statutes, such as this one, by foreign courts in private actions based directly on
the statute is not a likely prospect; see 3 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 1855-60.
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The demand for information adequate to protect American share-
holders has been tailored to the convenience of the foreign issuer. The
"registration" need contain only information released by such issuers
either voluntarily or under their domestic requirements. In addition,
the SEC is willing to police this requirement by relying on apparently
harmless administrative sanctions, which involve some unspecified
pressures on trading by American dealers.47 Indeed, the whole weight
of regulation has shifted to a mere request of disclosure of the viola-
tion, because the SEC does not presently intend to ban trading in the
securities of non-complying issuers. On the other hand, dealers who do
not disclose an issuer's failure to comply with the registration re-
quirement may in the future be found guilty of a "fraudulent device"
with attendant administrative and civil sanctions.48 Further, the SEC
plans to publish a "grey list" of the names of non-complying issuers,
on which dealers may rely in advising customers. 49
IV
THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS
If the process of reaching accommodation is viewed as a battle,
victory would seem to lie with the foreign issuers. Thus it is now ap-
47 If on that much. SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 8066 (Apr. 28, 1967),
states:
While no sanction will attach to any broker or dealer by reason of its trans-
actions in the securities of an issuer solely because it is listed as neither registered
nor exempt, the Commission expects that brokers and dealers will consider this
fact in deciding whether they have a reasonable basis for recommending these
securities to customers.
Id. at 3.
In fairness, however, the dissonance between such dealer sanctions and the ultimate aim
of investor protection should be noted; the current investor is the victim, not beneficiary,
of driving traders out of the market. See Note, supra note 1, at 339.
48 Note, supra note 1, at 339.
49 One such release was published during the interim period. SEC Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 7934 (Aug. 10, 1966).
Interesting side issues concern the standing of foreign issuers to be heard in court on
complaints against placement on such lists, fairness of any procedure for attempting
removal therefrom, and the power (statutory in the case of the SEC) to subject persons
to whatever detriment initial publicity imposes. See Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309
F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The suggested distinction, in Rehbinder, supra note 16, at 211
n.26, between the Canadian Restricted List involved in Kukatush and the "grey list" now
at issue, however, is not entirely convincing. While the former case involves the dealer
and thus only indirectly harmed the complaining issuer, later cases have rejected similar
suits even though the complainant was the very party harmed by the disclosure. See
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., CCH Tamna REG. REP. 72,385 (D.C.
'Cir. 1968); Lemov, Administrative Agency News Releases: Public Information Versus
Private Injury, 37 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 63 (1968).
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propriate to turn to the critical questions: Is the result reached a sound
result and how does one tell? These questions can only be answered
if certain subsidiary facts are known, because the questions are directed
at the weighing process and require quantitative data as well as some
subsidiary subjective judgments.
The data needed to judge the local benefits of extending the
Amendments to foreign issuers would provide answers to questions
like these: (1) Is there less need for regulation of foreign securities than
American securities? In other words, is this type of investment sub-
stantially limited to sophisticated investors? (2) Assuming the min-
imum of three hundred local shareholders, what is the volume of the
local market in foreign issues (whether securities or ADRs) and what is
the number of issues traded? (3) Are the answers to the foregoing ques-
tions uniform or is there significant variation depending upon the
nature or size of the issue, the country of issue, and the issuer's busi-
ness? Once this side of the scale is quantified, the data needed to deter-
mine the detriment of possible regulation upon the issuer become
important: (4) How closely do the already required foreign disclosures
approximate American requirements? (5) Can the foreign issuer
legally comply with American requirements under the foreign law?
Another issue is that of the inadvertency of the connection with
the American market: (6) Does the American marketmaker (especially
in ADRs) obtain issuer approval for its actions? Is it responsive to
persuasion from the issuer, and why? (7) At least in the past, have ADR
markets been succeeded by full scale issues on the United States capital
markets, or by decisions to list on a national exchange?
Finally, there are what might be called the negative costs of the
regulatory effort: (8) How expensive in terms of money and energy
is the regulatory and enforcement mechanism to the regulating state?
(9) What are the risks to present United States investors of imposing
the regulation with its sanctions? Will the market available to them
thin out, subjecting their investment to greater dangers than those
already posed? Would a grandfather clause be feasible?
The SEC procedure that led to the promulgation of the described
regulatory scheme did not allow the eliciting of such information, at
least not in any public way.50 A public notice of its intention to
50 Many comments relevant to the above questions can be found in various releases
and other communications, but the source, mode and evidentiary detail of their elicitation
are not dear. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8066, at 1-2 (Apr. 28,
1967):
The Commission made an extensive study of the disclosure and reporting
requirements and practices in many of the countries whose issuers have securities
traded in the United States....
The Commission also asked . . . foreign issuers . . . to furnish to the
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promulgate rules was given by the SEC; interested parties, mainly
foreign companies and ad hoc groups thereof, and American dealers
in foreign securities made representations to the SEC on aspects of
the proposed rules; thereafter definitive rules were issued. No rule-
making hearings were held (or requested) and no public record
as such was made, although most of the industry and interested-party
representations are available for inspection at the SEC's headquarters.5'
As a result, there was no public joining of issues to highlight relevant
policy choices embedded in the new regulations. Instead, the presenta-
tions range from assertions concerning international law and extra-
territoriality to detailed legal reviews of particular provisions and
problems posed thereunder. At no time, however, with the occasional
exception of a glancing blow at the motives presumed to underlie dif-
ferentiated treatment of Canadian issuers, are questions framed or
problems suggested relating to the described material issues.52 That
material justifications, in terms of investor protection, are not reviewed
is understandable, given the interest positions and thus the concern
of most persons responding. That problems of foreign "burden" are
reviewed only assertively rather than in evidentiary detail is perhaps
more surprising. This situation-and I suspect other case studies would
yield similar proof-suggests that private unilateral monologues are
no substitute for a public airing of the issues in the traditional open,
and if necessary, adversary, format. In that format the agency suggesting
a proposed regulatory scheme can reveal its concerns, and can obtain
reactions from two sources. On the one hand, the interests to be
regulated, assuming they have a common interest position, can chal-
lenge substantively unfounded assertions, and can in turn be chal-
lenged on substantively unfounded reactions. On the other hand, such
a process affords concurrent challenge of the administrative position
by third parties who stand, so to speak, to the left of the agency's
initial position-be they interested economic parties, journalists, pro-
Commission certain information which they made public abroad... . During its
first study, the Commission noted the improvement in the reporting of financial
information ... and voluntary disclosure by the companies . . . has re-enforced
the Commission's initial conclusions as to the quality of the information.
Compare the SEC's recent concern with publicity for staff interpretative and no-action
letters. SEC Securities Act of 1933 of Release No. 4924 (Sept. 20, 1968).
51 Compare the record made by the SEC when the treatment of ADR issuers was
discussed in 1955. CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIrs, OFFICIAL REPORT OF
PROCEEDINCS BEFORE THE SEcummRTES AND EXCHANCE COMMIssION (1955). As the author
has not read this report, reliance for the preceding comment on the evaluation is found
in Note, SEC Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Disclosure, Ltd., 65 YALE L.J.
861 (1956).
52 Compare the order of priorities in Phillips & Shipman, supra note 1, at 761.
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fessors, or crackpots.58 Similarly, such a process permits later examina-
tion and, if the passage of events warrants, later criticism and "advice."
Such openness of the regulatory process may not always be a
virtue. Delay and expense may dictate shortcuts in the case of trivial
situations. Very important problems (financial matters traditionally
seem to enjoy this aura) may occasionally suggest a need to rise above
principles of participatory democracy. Indeed, the agency's govern-
mental position gives color to its claim of representing the public in-
terest, and any mere private efforts to shape its position on a given
problem must therefore be limited to personal supplication. 4 It is no
secret, however, that the supplicants have begun to reject this role, and
that halting but unmistakable judicial approbation of their new
demands is being signaled.55 On balance, the costs of this trend are
not fearsome. Situations wherein costs would be too high-where the
only good decision can be a quiet one-will not lack announcers, nor
will the relevant interests lack their guardians.5 6
The pervasiveness of regulation and the paradoxical dependence
of the regulators upon their respondents-not so much in terms of
financial or political inferiority as in terms of access to relevant material
for decisions 5 7 -have made the efficient yet democratic achievement of
regulatory goals problematical to the point of theoretical crisis.58 The
53 It may also be required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1964).
I do not claim that the law requires hearings to be held (see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 7.06 (1958)), but that, the constraint of § 553(1) apart, good policy would often so
dictate. For a related recent critique, see Forte, Fair Hearing in Administrative
Rule-Making: A Recent Experience Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic and
Fair Packaging and Labeling Acts, 1968 DutJK L.J. 1.
54 See the comments of Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, replying to Congressman Celler's proposal that private parties
be granted intervention rights, reported in BNA ANTITR. & TRADE REG. REP. No. 297,
at A-15 to A-16, X-I to X-3 (Mar. 21, 1967); but see In The Matter of Applications by
American Broadcasting, Inc., 9 P&F RADIo REG. 2d 12, 48 (FCC 1966) (Johnson, Comm'r,
dissenting). See generally Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some
Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IowA L. REv. 983, 1008-10, 1016-17 (1968); Shapiro, Some
Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L. REv.
721, 740-48 (1968).
55 See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967);
but see United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. Cal. 1967), affd
sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 889 U.S. 580 (1968).
56 See Buxbaum, Antitrust Policy in Modern Society: Dilemmas and Needs, in
DAs UNTERNEHMEN IN DER RECHTSORDNUNG-FESTGABE FOR HEINRICIS KRONsTEIN 345, 864-66
(1967).
57 See L. JAFSE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACrION 13 (1965).
58 In lieu of the variety of dispassionate or tendentious comments available upon
this subject, see the wide-ranging review, as satisfying negatively as it is disappointing
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transnational dimension reveals an additional reason to challenge the
old system. At first glance one might argue that accommodations here
are best reached informally. If American economic policy dictates the
tapping of foreign markets by American-owned foreign subsidiaries,5 9
dependence upon foreign governments' willingness to allow this may
dictate caution in taking a hard line against unregulated foreign issues
that reach these shores in presumably secondary trading. 0 While it is
not suggested that this lies behind the accommodation described, it is
a useful hypothetical example. What may happen, and how easily,
when the political reasons for a given regulatory approach change? The
conclusory decision-the regulation that dispenses with a justifying
record-is particularly susceptible to politically expedient manipulation
along arbitrary or discriminatory lines.61 Foreign interests can be vul-
nerable to that danger in a manner not applicable to domestic ones.
The latter's manifold traditional channels of influence, frontdoor and
backdoor, create a web of constraints that can usually hold against fla-
grant abuse or outrageous experiment. The channels available to for-
eign interest are generally few and crude. Accordingly, the harmony of
challenge and counter-challenge is often missing. Stresses that ought
to be accommodated informally can instead lead to clumsy overreaction
at the international political level,6 2 if not to the resurgence of national
autarchy in an international society that can less and less afford it.
In a sense, the foreign issuer exemption from the 1964 Amend-
ments is not the best case from which to extrapolate these general
comments. For one thing, as has been briefly suggested, there is some
history in the way, which while it is not itself immune from critical
review of the sort here sketched, nevertheless explains many of the
current exemption details. Sections 14 and 16 have not been applied
in its proposals, in Loewi, The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism, 61 Am.
POL. Sei. REv. 5 (1967).
59 See the prevalence of Eurodollar debt and equity flotations at present, coupled
with the reverse barrier of the Interest Equalization Tax of 1963, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954
§§ 4911-20.
60 See Phillips 9- Shipman, supra note 1, at 761-62.
61 For one example see C. EDWARDS, TRADE REour ATIONS OVERSEAS 563, 573 (1966);
the recent debate over allowing accession to the proposed European Patent Convention
by the United States is another. See generally Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdic-
tion Over Antitrust Matters in the European Economic Community, 52 CALIF. L. REv.
56, 57 (1964).
62 An instructive recent example is reviewed in Walker, Dispute Settlement: The
Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964), though he can point to relatively smooth
resolution through the GATT machinery. Rougher fights are those mentioned in notes
4 and 5 supra. See generally 1 A. CHAYEs, T. EHRLicH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
I.cAL PROCFSS 249-575 (1968).
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to foreign issuers potentially subject thereto since the inception of the
regulatory scheme in 1934.3 Sections 12 and 13 have been more gen-
erally applied to issuing and listed companies, but with due considera-
tion to the less rigorous accounting and certification practices under
which many foreign issuers operate.64 The ADR market was essentially
liberated from even these registering and reporting obligations due
to what, with all respect to the contrary view of Professor Loss,65
I am constrained to call an unnecessary technical preoccupation of the
SEC.66 (Even if correct, however, the reasons for the ADR exemption
from a reasonable disclosure obligation do not dictate a similar result
for section 12(g) issuers. 67) It is proper to be concerned with even the
traditional practice, especially given the new congressional concern
inherent in the 1964 legislation; but at the same time it is important
to recognize that the only substantial material change from prior
practice lies in the abandonment of the special regime for Canadian
issuers.
Perhaps more important than history in justifying this anticlimactic
disclaimer is the well-deserved faith of the legal community in the es-
sential good judgment of the SEC. Yet an agency whose substantive
record engenders such reliance should be among the first to wish its
processes open to verification. Of all our regulatory superstructure, it
is the SEC that can best claim that it helped this society to reach the
point at which open processes are no longer idealistic and no longer
dangerous, but achievable and necessary.
63 Note 17 supra.
64 Note 20 supra.
65 1 L. Loss, supra note 18, at 463.
66 This opinion is developed in detail in Note, supra note 51, at 866-72; it is shared
in a conclusory fashion by Rehbinder, supra note 16, at 206 n.9.
67 The chapter and verse on this problem of ADR coverage is fully explained in
Note, supra note 51, at 868-71. It involves a technical problem concerning an exemption
of securities issued or guaranteed by a bank (banks being the customary source of
ADRs) from registration under § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(2) (1964). Obviously, this has no relevance to the legality of subjecting the foreign
securities themselves to registration.
